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The Tuttle Trilogy:
Habeas Corpus and Human Rights
BY ANNE S. EMANUEL*
E lbert Parr Tuttle joined the federal bench in 1954, shortly
after the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.' In 1960 he became the Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court with jurisdiction
over most of the deep south. As Chief Judge, he forged a
jurisprudence that effectively overcame the intransigence and
outright rebellion of those who denied fundamental constitution-
al rights to African Americans.
This Article revisits three cases Tuttle worked on while he
was a practicing attorney. Each case involved "the Great Writ,"
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, and in each, Tuttle worked on a pro
bono basis. In Downer v. Dunaway,' Tuttle tried to obtain a fair
trial for John Downer and save Downer's life. Tuttle failed on
both counts; his reward lay in the justness of his effort which was
enough to sustain him. Later in Herndon v. Lowry3 and Johnson
v. Zerbst,4 Tuttle's work was rewarded when the United States
Supreme Court rendered landmark decisions in favor of his
clients.
Elbert Tuttle's pro bono work as an attorney helped shape
his jurisprudence.5 By taking as clients men who could not
afford his services, Tuttle experienced the sometimes rank
failings of the judicial system as it dealt with citizens who were
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Photograph of Justice Harold Hitz Burton swearing Judge Elbert Parr Tuttle in as a Judge
of the Fifth Circuit on September 1, 1954 at the Supreme Court. (Photograph courtesy of
the Tuttle Famdy)
disfavored and disadvantaged, whether because of race, ideology,
or simple poverty. Whatever illusions Tuttle had held, he was
disabused of. But he was neither discouraged nor deterred in his
personal creed; as an attorney, and later as a judge, he would
seek to obtain justice whenever he could. Decades later, he
advised college graduates: "The job is there, and you will see it,
and your strength is such . . . that you need not consider what
the task will cost you. It is not enough that you do your duty.
The richness of life lies in the performance which is above and
beyond the call of duty."6
I. John Downer
In 1931 Elbert Tuttle was a rising legal star in Atlanta. Seven
years earlier Tuttle and his brother-in-law, Bill Sutherland, former
clerk to Justice Louis Brandeis, founded a law firm that special-
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ized in corporate work, particularly in corporate tax work. The
firm, Sutherland and Tuttle, enjoyed success even in the
Depression years. Married to Bill Sutherland's sister Sara, Tuttle
had two young children, and he and Sara enjoyed an active and
gracious social life.
Then, as now, few attorneys, and precious few of Elbert
Tuttle's rank and class, took on pro bono work for society's
outcasts. In 1931 in Georgia, a black man accused of raping a
white woman could not expect many helping hands to be
extended to him. Had Elbert Tuttle not been a Captain in the
National Guard, he might never have known John Downer. But
he was, and on the afternoon of May 19, 1931, he was ordered to
Elberton, Georgia to help hold the jail against the violent attack
of a mob attempting to lynch two black men held there. One of
them was John Downer.
That night Tuttle and others managed to stave off the mob.
They held the jail with the help of several national guard units,
tear gas, and machine gun fire. A week later, on May 26th,
Tuttle was back in Elberton commanding troops and keeping
order atJohn Downer's trial. Standing guard in the courtroom,
Tuttle watched as Downer's attorneys went to trial only two hours
after having been appointed to represent him. At the end of a
long day, Tuttle watched as the judge charged the jury, and
waited as the jury deliberated-for six minutes. He watched as
the jury returned a guilty verdict with a recommendation of
execution, and as the trial court pronounced sentence: death by
electrocution.
Over the next few weeks, Tuttle put together a team of
attorneys to pursue relief for John Downer. Because Tuttle had
been personally involved in Downer's trial and needed to be
available as a witness to what had transpired, he was never
attorney of record for Downer. Nonetheless, Tuttle spearheaded
Downer's successful petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
remained involved until Downer's death in Georgia's electric
chair on March 16, 1934. During the three years between the
first trial and Downer's execution, Downer's attorneys succeeded
in obtaining a writ of habeas corpus and a new trial. The second
trial produced another conviction and a sentence of death. This
time the jury deliberated for an hour.7
Downer's execution was particularly bitter to Tuttle because
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Tuttle believed Downer to be an innocent man. Still, Tuttle took
from the case a measure of satisfaction: good men had joined
together in an all but hopeless cause. They had not, in the end,
prevailed. They had not been able to afford John Downer a truly
fair trial before a jury of his peers, untainted by extreme racial
bias. But they had done what they could against enormous odds.
They had afforded John Downer a modicum of dignity, and their
work reaffirmed a nascent principle. Only eight years earlier, in
1923, the United States Supreme Court first held that allegations
of mob dominance of a trial, raised in Moore v. Dempsey,8 autho-
rized the federal district court to proceed with a hearing on a
habeas corpus petition, that is, to proceed to consider the validity
of the conviction.9 Eight years before that, in 1915, ruling on an
appeal by Leo Frank from his conviction for murder in an
Atlanta courtroom dominated by anti-Semitic bias, the United
States Supreme Court deferred to the courts of Georgia and
found no due process violation." In 1931, Downer v. Dun-
away" marked the first time a federal court in Georgia invoked
the principle that dominance by a mob could result in a violation
of the accused's right to due process to strike a state court
conviction."
II. Angelo Herndon
In the next two habeas matters he handled, Elbert Tuttle
had little doubt that his clients had violated the law. Angelo
Herndon had, quite deliberately. Serious beyond his years and
brave beyond all measure, the nineteen-year-old black man
organized a multi-racial protest of the City of Atlanta's decision
to end relief funding. The year was 1932, and the circumstances
could not have been more dire nor more dangerous. The
Emergency Relief Committee, which had provided the only
source of support for many of the four thousand families it
served, had run out of money. The county government slashed
salaries-some, including the salaries of the district attorney and
superior courtjudges, by as much as twenty-five percent-but the
money saved was pledged to reduce the deficit, not to provide
relief. Many wage earners were suffering, albeit not as much as
the unemployed. Still, the county commission had resisted
raising taxes."
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Leftists, communists, and other activists in the Atlanta area
formed the Unemployed Council. As the voice of the dispos-
sessed, the Council worked hard aiding the unemployed in
finding work and assistance. When the Emergency Relief
Committee was forced to announce it was closing its doors, the
Council decided to take direct action. Angelo Herndon and his
colleagues prepared and distributed pamphlets calling for a rally
at the Fulton County Courthouse. On June 30, 1932, some one
thousand desperate people, black and white, gathered. The
stunned county commissioners met with a small delegation of
unemployed white workers and barred black demonstrators from
the meeting. Then they promised an appropriation of six
thousand dollars to buy groceries for families cut off earlier and
suggested that the county would pay transportation costs for
anyone who had family outside Atlanta and who wanted to leave.
The crowd dispersed.
A few days later, Atlanta detectives arrested Angelo Herndon
as he picked up mail from a post office box used by the Unem-
ployed Council. He was taken in under a charge of "on suspi-
cion." On the ledger at the police headquarters, the vague
charge was clarified-one word, "Communist," was scribbled
across from his name. Herndon was held without bond for
investigation until a Superior Court judge ordered that he be
indicted or freed. On July 22, eleven days after Herndon's arrest,
he was indicted for attempting to incite insurrection. By calling
meetings, making speeches, and circulating pamphlets, the
indictment charged, he was inciting insurrection, uprisings, and
riots and attempting to overthrow the lawful authority of the
State of Georgia.
Given the temper of the times when Angelo Herndon was
tried, his conviction was a foregone conclusion; the only surprise
came when the jury took three hours to return a verdict. The
delay, it turned out, had nothing to do with the verdict. The jury
had been unable to agree on the sentence because two jurors
wanted to impose the death penalty. In the end, his sentence of
eighteen to twenty years to be served on a Georgia chain gang
was the equivalent of the death penalty.
Angelo Herndon's attorneys appealed his conviction. While
Herndon's appeal was pending, John Downer was executed on
March 16, 1934. Two months later, on May 24, 1934, the
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Georgia Supreme Court issued its opinion in Herndon's case. 4
His objections to the all-white jury panel and to the constitution-
ality of the statute were dismissed as not timely raised. 5 The
Court addressed one First Amendment issue raised by Hem-
don.'6 Herndon argued that even if the statute was constitu-
tional, the evidence was insufficient to establish that his speech
was so imminently dangerous as to be subject to suppression.
The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed. v Angelo Herndon's
conviction was affirmed."
The case became a cause celebre, locally and nationally. In
mid-June, probably in an effort to deflect criticism, the State
agreed to bail. The defense team's sense of victory evaporated
when Judge Wyatt, who had tried the matter, set bail at fifteen
thousand dollars. Despite the fact that the figure was almost
prohibitive, the International Labor Defense ("ILD"), which some
saw as the legal arm of the Communist party,'9 and which had
sponsored Herndon's defense team, now committed itself to
raising bail. On August 4th, Angelo Herndon left the Fulton
Towers, where he had been imprisoned, in the company of two
of his attorneys and two detectives sent by the Seaboard Railroad.
The day before his release, the National Committee for the
Defense of Political Prisoners received a call warning that the Ku
Klux Klan would not let Herndon leave Georgia. Herndon
planned to take the train to New York that evening, so the
railroad assigned the two detectives to accompany him from the
jail to the train and to remain with him on the train until he left
the South. Governor Talmadge took the threats less seriously.
When the nationally acclaimed novelist Theodore Dreiser called
the Governor, Talmadge reassured him: "'I get letters and
telegrams every day from people worried about the matter, . ..
but the people down here don't molest a nigger for any crime
except raping a white woman."'20
Angelo Herndon was free but only until the legal proceed-
ings were concluded. In late September, the Georgia Supreme
Court denied his petition for rehearing. Now his only recourse
was the United States Supreme Court. At this juncture, the ILD
recognized the need for distinguished counsel. Carol Weiss King,
a leftist New York city attorney, sought help.21 She enlisted
Whitney North Seymour, a prominent attorney and dedicated
civil libertarian who would later become the president of the
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American Bar Association. At age thirty, he had served as first
assistant to the Solicitor General. A Republican, an Episcopalian,
and a graduate of Columbia Law School, Seymour's credentials
were impeccable. His connections matched his credentials. He
contacted Harvard law school graduate and former law clerk to
Justice Brandeis, William A. Sutherland, in Atlanta and sought his
help.22 Sutherland signed on and enlisted his brother-in-law,
Elbert Tuttle. Walter Gellhorn and Herbert Wechsler, two young
Columbia law professors who would be luminaries of the
profession completed the team.2" Herndon could not have had
stronger representation.
Nor could Herndon's timing have been better. On February
15, 1935, the Court heard oral argument in one of the infamous
Scottsboro boys cases.2 4 On April 1st the Court announced its
decision and reversed the conviction of Clarence Norris, holding
unconstitutional the systematic exclusion of black citizens from
jury service.2 5 Herndon's attorneys had not perfected their
challenge to the Fulton County jury panels, so the issue was not
before the Court in Herndon's case; nonetheless, everyone knew
that he had suffered the same injustice. Moreover, Herndon's
case had captured the attention of the national press. On April
10th the New Republic carried an editorial which concluded that
"'[flew cases in American jurisprudence have been of greater
importance than the appeal of Angelo Herndon.'
26
On April 12, 1935, Whitney North Seymour, accompanied by
Bill Sutherland at counsels' table, arose and eloquently argued
the First Amendment issues presented by the Georgia statute.
Seymour's brilliance and the weight of the matter notwithstand-
ing, the Court did not reach the issues he argued. On May 20,
1935, a scant six weeks after oral argument, the Court dismissed
Herndon's appeal, ruling that because he had failed to raise his
constitutional arguments at the earliest opportunity and failed to
allow the trial court to address them, there was no federal
question on appeal that would give the United States Supreme
Court jurisdiction.27
At the beginning of the next term, the Court denied
Herndon's motion for rehearing. On Monday morning, October
28th, accompanied by Elbert Tuttle, his attorney, and by Joseph
North, a sympathetic journalist, Angelo Herndon surrendered to
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Sheriff James Lowry and re-entered the Fulton Tower prison in
Atlanta.28
With his client in jail, Tuttle prepared to file his petition for
writ of habeas corpus. The great writ allowed Herndon to
challenge his conviction on federal constitutional grounds. The
Georgia statute Tuttle asserted on behalf of his client was too
vague to be enforceable. A plain reading would render criminal
great amounts of speech that was clearly protected by the First
Amendment.
The Superior Court of Fulton County, the county in which
Herndon was incarcerated, had jurisdiction over the petition. At
the time, it was possible to file a petition with a particular judge,
as opposed to the current practice of filing the petition with the
Clerk of the Court, who then distributes all cases using a random
assignment system. Tuttle chose to file the petition with Judge
Hugh M. Dorsey, a former governor of Georgia.
Two decades earlier, while Hugh Dorsey was district attorney,
he won the conviction of a young Jewish man, Leo Frank, for
the rape and murder of Mary Phagan. Marked by intense anti-
semitism, the Frank trial remains one of the most notorious in
American legal history. Leo Frank had been raised in Brooklyn
and educated at Pratt and Cornell, where he earned a degree in
Mechanical Engineering in 1906. A year or two later, he moved
to Atlanta to work with his uncle in opening a pencil factory in
downtown Atlanta. Frank was a part owner of the company and
the superintendent of the factory. In the early morning hours of
April 27, 1913, the Negro night watchman, Newt Lee, found the
body of a fourteen-year-old employee, Mary Phagan, lying lifeless
in the basement. An inept police investigation immediately
focused on Newt Lee and Leo Frank. Frank saw Mary Phagan
when she collected her pay and was apparently the last person
other than her murderer to see her alive. Frank was arrested for
the crime on April 29th.
History's verdict is that Leo Frank was innocent of the crime.
Jim Conley, the Negro janitor who was used as a witness against
Frank, was more likely the perpetrator. But once the police
arrested Frank, the press seized upon him, and the public was all
too easily convinced of his guilt. Frank was a perfect target, as
the pastor of the Phagan family's Baptist Church explained:
THE TUTTLE TRILOGY
"My feelings, upon the arrest of the poor old negro nightwatchman, were
to the effect that this one old negro would be poor atonement for the life
of this innocent girl. But, when on the next day, the police arrested a
Jew, and a Yankee Jew at that, all of the inborn prejudice againstJews rose
up in a feeling of satisfaction, that here would be a victim worthy to pay
for the crime.
"2q
Frank was convicted and sentenced to die after a trial
dominated, by virtually all accounts, by an anti-semitic mob.
Nonetheless, in 1915, the United States Supreme Court denied
relief"0 Frank then sought clemency from the Georgia Prison
Commission. By then, his case was so strong that his supporters
dared to hope that clemency would be granted. In October
1914, Jim Conley's attorney had announced that his client had
killed Mary Phagan. He contended that it was his duty to come
forward to save the life of an innocent man and that his disclo-
sure could not harm his client because he had been convicted of
complicity in the crime (Conley had claimed to have helped
Frank move the body to the basement) and could not be retried.
Even the trial court judge, who had since died, had written
Frank's attorney to state his own lack of certainty in Frank's guilt
and to admit that "perhaps he had shown 'undue deference to
the opinion of the jury."'' In point of fact, he had no doubt
deferred to the mob, not the jury. Judge Roan's letter accounted
for the vote of one commissioner that Frank's sentence be
commuted, but that lone commissioner did not carry the day.
The final vote was 2-1. Frank's last hope was an appeal for
clemency from the Governor of Georgia.
32
GovernorJohn Slayton was by then near the end of his term.
His successor, Nathaniel Harris, would be sworn in on June 26,
1915. Frank's attorneys hastened to get his petition for clemency
on Slayton's desk before he left office. Harris, they knew, was a
close friend and political associate of Tom Watson, the one-time
populist who had retreated to Georgia's White Democratic Party
with all of its prejudices. Tom Watson fed the vituperative anti-
semitic campaign against Leo Frank, using his weekly newspaper,
The Jeffersonian, and his magazine, Watson's Monthly. Governor
Slayton could have left the matter for his successor to handle.
Instead, after agonizing deliberation and painstaking review, he
commuted Frank's death sentence. The public reacted swiftly.
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Angry mobs attacked the capital and the governor's mansion,
forcing Slayton and his wife to leave the state. Two months later,
twenty-five community leaders from Mary Phagan's hometown,
Marietta, drove the 125 miles from Marietta to the state prison
farm at Milledgeville where Frank was held, overcame the two
guards on duty, and seized Frank. The cavalcade then drove
back to Marietta, where Leo Frank was hanged.
Decades passed before the Jewish community in Atlanta
regained a sense of security." John Slaton, once considered a
certain candidate for a seat in the Senate, would never hold
political office again. For the prosecutor, Hugh Dorsey, however,
the episode provided a great political boost. In 1916, the year
after the lynching, "the demand for his entrance into the
gubernatorial race was so strong 'that it swept the state like a
prairie fire, rolling from the mountains to the sea."'34 He won
overwhelmingly.
After his term as Governor and after being defeated by Tom
Watson in a three-way race for the Senate,35 Dorsey became a
judge, first on the Atlanta City Court and then on the Fulton
County Superior Court. Many were startled when Tuttle chose
to file Herndon's petition for writ of habeas corpus with Dorsey,
but Tuttle had good reason for his choice. He knew Dorsey
personally and got along with him well. He also knew that
during his term as Governor, Dorsey had been a moderate on
race. R.B. Eleazer, of the Commisson on Interracial Coopera-
tion, described Dorsey as "'quite fair-minded in his interracial
attitudes.' 3 6 The reason Tuttle gave for choosing Dorsey was
both the simplest and the most compelling. "I thought," Tuttle
would say quietly, "that he might be ready to atone."
37
The hearing on Herndon's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus began on November 12, 1935. Herndon, who was still
being held in Fulton Towers, was allowed to attend. Dressed in
a suit and tie, Herndon sat at counsel table with a large book in
front of him with lettering so clear that observers could see the
title: The Letters of Sacco and Vanzetti.
Whitney North Seymour traveled to Atlanta for the hearing.
He shared the time for argument with Bill Sutherland. Elbert
Tuttle, who drafted the petition and handled the legwork,
deferred to Seymour and to his brother-in-law. Seymour handled
the formal First Amendment argument, contending that the
THE TUTTLE TRILOGY
Photograph from the swearing in ceremony on September 1, 1954 ofJudge Elbert Parr Tuttle.
From left to right: ChiefJustice Earl Warren,Justice Harold Hitz Burton, andJudge and Mrs.
Tuttle. Judge Tuttle knew Chief Justice Warren from their work on the Eisenhower
campaign, and he had asked Warren to swear him in. Warren declined with regrets
because his schedule took him out of town on the designated day. As it happened, Warren
was in Washington that day after all, and he joined Tuttle's family and friends at the
ceremony. (Photograph courtesy of the Tuttle Family)
statute violated the principle that speech not presenting a clear
and present danger could not be suppressed and that the statute
was too vague to be enforceable. Sutherland, a native Georgian,
was blunt: "' [T]his conviction,"' he argued, "'places the state of
Georgia in a ridiculous position before the people of this country
and the world.' '. 8
Three weeks later, Judge Dorsey handed down his opinion:
the statute was too vague to be enforceable; it did not set "a
sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt."39  A valid law
protecting against insurrection could be drafted and survive
constitutional muster, but this one did not. Dorsey gave the state
twenty days to file a notice of appeal and ordered Herndon
released on a bond of eight thousand dollars pending appeal.
Tuttle lost no time; before one o'clock that afternoon, he
met his client in the sheriffs office at Fulton Towers. Cliff
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Mackay, a reporter with Atlanta's black-owned newspaper, The
Daily World, was there as well. Tuttle paid the bond, and the.
three men left together. Later that evening, Herndon left
Atlanta on a train to New York. As a precautionary measure,
Sutherland and Tuttle delegated a young attorney from the firm,
Ed Kane, to travel with Herndon. Even though Kane's sole
reason for the trip was to accompany Herndon, when they
boarded the train they had to part company. In the 1930s, in the
American South, passenger trains' cars were segregated by
race.
40
The Herndon case was far from over. The Georgia Supreme
Court reversed Judge Dorsey's ruling, only to be reversed itself by
the United States Supreme Court. The final opinion, Herndon v.
Lowry,4 remains a landmark in First Amendment jurisprudence.
III. John Johnson
When Angelo Herndon boarded the train to leave Atlanta in
December 1935, Tuttle's next habeas corpus client, John
Johnson, had been languishing in the Atlanta Federal Penitentia-
ry for nearly a year. Monroe Bridwell and Johnson, two young
marines stationed in South Carolina, were arrested in the fall of
1934 at a Charleston brothel for passing forged bills. Indicted
for possessing and uttering counterfeit money and unable to
raise bail, they remained in jail until January 23, 1935, when they
were taken to court for arraignment and trial.
Exactly what happened that day in the courtroom has never
been resolved. When the court proceeded with the arraignment,
notified the defendants of the charges against them, and asked
for their pleas, they pleaded not guilty. The court asked if they
had counsel but did not ask if they wished to have counsel
appointed. On those points, all parties agree. HoweverJohnson
and Bridwell later contended that they did want representation,
that they asked the district attorney to arrange for counsel,42
and that the district attorney told them that in South Carolina
counsel was only appointed in capital cases. The district attorney
denied that any request was made.
They proceeded to trial. Johnson and Bridwell contended
that they told the judge they were ready to proceed because the
district attorney told them it was too late to subpoena witnesses.
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The district attorney denied having said that as well. Havingjust
learned of the charges against them, and with no access to the
advice of counsel, Johnson and Bridwell acquiesced in the
proceedings. By the end of the day they stood convicted; each
was sentenced to four years and six months imprisonment. Two
days later they were transported to the Atlanta Federal Peniten-
tiary and placed in isolation for sixteen days, as was the custom
with new prisoners. Nearly four months later, on May 15th, they
filed notices of appeal, which were quickly dismissed as untimely.
Johnson and Bridwell then filed petitions for writs of habeas
corpus. Because they were incarcerated in Atlanta, jurisdiction
lay in the federal district court in Atlanta. When they appeared,
Judge Underwood, noting that they "were men of little education
and without counsel or funds to procure same," offered to
appoint counsel to represent them.4' They accepted.44
Judge Underwood appointed Atlanta attorney Frank
Doughman, who investigated and took depositions in preparation
for the hearing. At the hearing, Doughman convinced Judge
Underwood of a critical point: the defendants had a constitu-
tional right to have counsel appointed before they were tried for
felonies in federal court.45 The judge agreed but ruled it was
too late to raise that claim. It should, he found, have been
asserted on appeal. Judge Underwood was troubled by the
convictions, but he did not think that he had jurisdiction.46
Judge Underwood's opinion clarified the unfairness of the
result, and his own dissatisfaction seemed apparent. On one
hand, that gave ammunition to Bridwell and Johnson. On the
other hand, it strenghtened the order that even a sympathetic
judge could not find a way to rule for them. Judge Underwood's
description of the defendants conveyed his concerns: "Both
petitioners," he wrote, "lived in distant cites of other states and
neither had relatives, friends, or acquaintances in Charleston.
Both had little education and were without funds."47 And both
stood convicted.
Appointed counsel did his job and lost; he would not go
forward. At that point, Judge Underwood contacted Elbert
Tuttle.48 For a federal judge to seek pro bono counsel to
defend a criminal prosecution or to file a petition for habeas
corpus was not unusual. Seeking out an attorney to handle an
appeal from his own order was unusual. Tuttle took Judge
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Underwood's call seriously. He went to the prison to meet
Johnson.49 Johnson explained that he would be happy to have
Tuttle represent him, but he could not afford to pay.
The ACLU was interested in the litigation. It could not pay
attorney fees, but it did pay for the printing costs in the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. When the three judge panel unani-
mously affirmed in a brisk opinion, ruling that habeas corpus was
not a substitute for a writ of error on appeal, further appeal
seemed futile, especially because there was no further appeal of
right. The matter could only go forward on writ of certiorari.
The ACLU could not continue financial support. That meant
Tuttle himself had to pay court costs, printing costs, and his own
travel expenses.
Tuttle decided to continue alone. He filed a petition for
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Certiorari
was granted, and the case was set for oral argument. Tuttle
argued the case himself; it would be the only case he argued
before the United States Supreme Court. "I quit while I was
ahead," he would say with a smile. Johnson v. Zerbst would also
prove to be one of the most significant constitutional criminal
procedure cases ever decided."
Tuttle had to win on two grounds to secure a real victory for
his client. First, he had to convince the Court that a defendant
in a federal felony trial had a constitutional right to appointed
counsel.5' At that time, it was not uncommon for federal
judges to appoint counsel and it may even have been more
common than not.52 Had Bridwell or Johnson asked the federal
district court judge for counsel, an attorney may well have been
provided. As it was then understood, however, the Constitution
did not require that counsel be provided. In only one case,
Powell v. Alabama,53 one of the Scottsboro boy cases, had the
Supreme Court found a constitutional right to appointed
counsel.54 Powell, however, was a death penalty case. In Powell,
a case replete with egregious injustice, the Court held that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required
appointment of counsel in capital cases. It was a long step from
a rule applying only in capital cases to a rule applying in all
federal felonies.
The second ground on which Tuttle had to prevail was even
more intractable. It was the point that had bedeviled Judge
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Underwood, who had been sympathetic to Bridwell and Johnson
on the appointment of counsel issue. Even if you assumed that
they did have a right to counsel, how could you get around the
fact that they had waived it? The judge had asked them if they
were ready to proceed, and they said "yes." They had not said,
"no, because we don't have a lawyer," or "may we have a lawyer."
By deciding not to raise the issue, by simply going forward, they
had waived any right they might have. The waiver issue had
enormous ramifications, and the members of the Court could be
expected to be sensitive to them.
Justice Black wrote the opinion for the Court, and only four
other Justices joined it.55 That was enough. On behalf of his
client, John Johnson, Tuttle won a sweeping victory. The Sixth
Amendment, Justice Black wrote, required that before a defen-
dant could be tried in federal court for a felony, he must be
provided with the assistance of counsel, unless he had waived his
right to counsel.56 That the due process clause required waivers
to be voluntary had already been established.57 Justice Black
went considerably further by ruling that a defendant could not
be considered to have waived a right he did not know he had;
that is, even a voluntary waiver would only be effective if it was
also knowing and intelligent.58
Both rulings made by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbs5 9 were
important, but the ruling on the right to counsel applied only in
federal felony proceedings. The waiver rule, on the other hand,
applied to the waiver of most federal constitutional rights.6"
Over the next few decades, Johnson v. Zerbst became the most
often cited opinion in American jurisprudence.
By the time the Supreme Court ruled, Johnson had been
imprisoned for three years. Tuttle went back to the Atlanta
penitentiary to tell him the good news. Tuttle had not yet had
the order releasing Johnson signed because the Supreme Court
had ordered the matter remanded for determination of whether
there had been a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
the right to counsel. If Tuttle had the order signed, and if on
remand the lower court found there had been no waiver, the
original conviction would be set aside andJohnson could be tried
again. That was unlikely but possible. It gave Johnson pause.
He was getting out anyway, within days, on good behavior. He
could just let things be, but then he would have a felony
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conviction on his record. Johnson decided to take the chance;
he directed Tuttle to have the order signed.
Before Tuttle left, Johnson asked him a question: "You must
have put up some money?" Tuttle responded that he had spent
a couple of hundred dollars. "Well," Johnson said, "I'll send you
a check someday." Someday never came. Tuttle did not
particularly mind. He had never expected to be repaid in
money, and he considered himself well compensated: he had
been able to secure justice for an individual who had been ill-
served. Moreover, he had made an enormous contribution
toward securing justice for multitudes whom he would never
know.
6 1
"The job is there, and you will see it, and your strength is
such ... that you need not consider what the task will cost you. It is not
enough that you do your duty. The richness of life lies in the performance
which is above and beyond the call of duty. '"2
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